#### Blockchain



# CS 240: Computing Systems and Concurrency Lecture 20

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Credits: Michael Freedman and Kyle Jamieson developed much of the original material.

## Bitcoin: 10,000 foot view

- New bitcoins are "created" every ~10 min, owned by "miner" (more on this later)
- Thereafter, just keep record of transfers
  - e.g., Alice pays Bob 1 BTC


- Basic protocol:
  - Alice signs transaction:  $txn = Sign_{Alice} (BTC, PK_{Bob})$
  - Alice shows transaction to others...

## **Problem: Equivocation!**

Can Alice "pay" both Bob and Charlie with same bitcoin?


(Known as "double spending")

## How traditional e-cash handled problem



- When Alice pays Bob with a coin, Bob validates that coin hasn't been spend with trusted third party
- Introduced "blind signatures" and "zero-knowledge protocols" so bank can't link withdrawals and deposits

## How traditional e-cash handled problem



 When Alice pays Bob with a coin, Bob validates that coin hasn't been spend with trusted third party

Bank maintains linearizable log of transactions

## Problem: Equivocation!

Goal: No double-spending in decentralized environment

Approach: Make transaction log

- 1. public
- 2. append-only
- 3. strongly consistent

## Bitcoin: 10,000 foot view

- Public
  - Transactions are signed:  $txn = Sign_{Alice} (BTC, PK_{Bob})$
  - All transactions are sent to all network participants

- No equivocation: Log append-only and consistent
  - All transactions part of a hash chain
  - Consensus on set/order of operations in hash chain

## Cryptographic hash function

(and their use in blockchain)

## Cryptography Hash Functions I


- Take message m of arbitrary length and produces fixed-size (short) number H(m)
- One-way function
  - Efficient: Easy to compute H(m)
  - Hiding property: Hard to find an m, given H(m)
    - Assumes "m" has sufficient entropy, not just {"heads", "tails"}
  - Random: Often assumes for output to "look" random

## Cryptography Hash Functions II


Collisions exist: | possible inputs | >> | possible outputs |
 ... but hard to find

- Collision resistance:
  - Strong resistance: Find any m!= m' such that H(m) == H(m')
  - Weak resistance: Given m, find m' such that H(m) == H(m')
  - For 160-bit hash (SHA-1)
    - Finding any collision is birthday paradox:  $2^{160/2} = 2^{80}$
    - Finding specific collision requires 2^160

## **Hash Pointers**




#### Hash chains



Creates a "tamper-evident" log of data

#### Hash chains




If data changes, all subsequent hash pointers change Otherwise, found a hash collision!

## **Blockchain**


Append-only hash chain

## Blockchain: Append-only hash chain



- Hash chain creates "tamper-evident" log of txns
- Security based on collision-resistance of hash function
  - Given m and h = hash(m), difficult to find m' such that h = hash(m') and m != m'

## Blockchain: Append-only hash chain




#### Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

Satoshi Nakamoto satoshin@gmx.com www.bitcoin.org

**Abstract.** A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main

## Problem remains: forking



#### **Goal: Consensus**

- Recall Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols to achieve consensus of replicated log
  - Requires:  $n \ge 3f + 1$  nodes, at most f faulty

- Problem
  - Communication complexity is  $n^2$
  - Requires view of network participants

## Consensus susceptible to Sybils

- All consensus protocols based on membership...
  - ... assume independent failures ...
  - ... which implies strong notion of identity
- "Sybil attack" (P2P literature ~2002)
  - Idea: one entity can create many "identities" in system
  - Typical defense: 1 IP address = 1 identity
  - Problem: IP addresses aren't difficult / expensive to get, esp. in world of botnets & cloud services

#### Consensus based on "work"


 Rather than "count" IP addresses, bitcoin "counts" the amount of CPU time / electricity that is expended

"The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes."

- Satoshi Nakamoto

 Proof-of-work: Cryptographic "proof" that certain amount of CPU work was performed

## Key idea: Chain length requires work



- Generating a new block requires "proof of work"
- "Correct" nodes accept longest chain
- Creating fork requires rate of malicious work >> rate of correct
  - So, the older the block, the "safer" it is from being deleted

## Use hashing to determine work!

- Hash functions are one-way / collision resistant
  - Given h, hard to find m such that h = hash(m)

- But what about finding partial collision?
  - -m whose hash has most significant bit = 0?
  - m whose hash has most significant bit = 00?
  - Assuming output is randomly distributed, complexity grows exponentially with # bits to match

## Bitcoin proof of work

Find **nonce** such that


hash (nonce | prev\_hash | block data) < target

i.e., hash has certain number of leading 0's

What about changes in total system hashing rate?


- Target is recalculated every 2 weeks
- Goal: One new block every 10 minutes

#### Historical hash rate trends of bitcoin



### Historical hash rate trends of bitcoin






Currently (Nov '17):

11 Exahash/s 2 x 10<sup>18</sup>

Tech:  $CPU \rightarrow GPU \rightarrow FPGA \rightarrow ASICs$ 

## Why consume all this energy?



- Creating a new block creates bitcoin!
  - Initially 50 BTC, decreases over time, currently 12.5
  - New bitcoin assigned to party named in new block
  - Called "mining" as you search for gold/coins

## Incentivizing correct behavior?

 Race to find nonce and claim block reward, at which time race starts again for next block


hash (nonce | prev\_hash | block data)

- As solution has prev\_hash, corresponds to particular chain
- Correct behavior is to accept longest chain
  - "Length" determined by aggregate work, not # blocks
  - So miners incentivized only to work on longest chain, as otherwise solution not accepted
  - Remember blocks on other forks still "create" bitcoin, but only matters if chain in collective conscious (majority)

#### Form of randomized leader election


- Each time a nonce is found:
  - New leader elected for past epoch (~10 min)
  - Leader elected randomly, probability of selection proportional to leader's % of global hashing power
  - Leader decides which transactions comprise block

## One block = many transactions




- Each miner picks a set of transactions for block
- Builds "block header": prevhash, version, timestamp, txns, ...
- Until hash < target OR another node wins:</li>
  - Pick nonce for header, compute hash = SHA256(SHA256(header))

## Transactions are delayed



- At some time T, block header constructed
- Those transactions had been received [ T − 10 min, T]
- Block will be generated at time T + 10 min (on average)
- So transactions are from 10 20 min before block creation
- Can be much longer if "backlog" of transactions are long

## Commitments further delayed



- When do you trust a transaction?
  - After we know it is "stable" on the hash chain
  - Recall that the longer the chain, the hard to "revert"
- Common practice: transaction "committed" when 6 blocks deep
  - i.e., Takes another ~1 hour for txn to become committed

## **Transaction format: strawman**

Create 12.5 coins, credit to Alice	
Transfer 3 coins from Alice to Bob	SIGNED(Alice)
Transfer 8 coins from Bob to Carol	SIGNED(Bob)
Transfer 1 coins from Carol to Alice	SIGNED(Carol)
Transfer 5 coins from Alice to David	SIGNED(Alice)

How do you determine if Alice has balance?

Scan backwards to time 0!

## **Transaction format**

```
Inputs:
             Ø
                             // Coinbase reward
Outputs:
             25.0→PK Alice
             H(prevtxn, 0) // 25 BTC from Alice
Inputs:
Outputs:
             25.0→PK Bob
                                        change address
             H (prevtxn, 0)
                            // 25 B
Inputs:
Outputs:
             5.0→PK Bob, 20.0 →PK Alice2
                                               SIGNED(Alice)
Inputs:
             H (prevtxn1, 1), H(prevtxn2, 0) // 10+5 BTC
Outputs:
             14.9→PK Bob
                                               SIGNED(Alice)
```


- Transaction typically has 1+ inputs, 1+ outputs
- Making change: 1<sup>st</sup> output payee, 2<sup>nd</sup> output self
- Output can appear in single later input (avoids scan back)

### **Transaction format**

```
Inputs:
             Ø
                             // Coinbase reward
Outputs:
             25.0→PK Alice
Inputs:
             H(prevtxn, 0) // 25 BTC from Alice
Outputs:
             25.0→PK Bob
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Inputs:
             H (prevtxn, 0) // 25 BTC From Alice
Outputs:
             5.0→PK Bob, 20.0 →PK Alice
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Outputs:
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```


- Unspent portion of inputs is "transaction fee" to miner
- In fact, "outputs" are stack-based scripts
- 1 Block = 1MB max

## Storage / verification efficiency



- Merkle tree
  - Binary tree of hashes
  - Root hash "binds" leaves given collision resistance
- Using a root hash
  - Block header now constant size for hashing
  - Can prune tree to reduce storage needs over time

## Storage / verification efficiency




- Merkle tree
  - Binary tree of hashes
  - Root hash "binds" leaves given collision resistance
- Using a root hash
  - Block header now constant size for hashing
  - Can prune tree to reduce storage needs over time
    - Can prune when all txn outputs are spent
    - Now: 168GB

## Not panacea of scale as some claim

#### Scaling limitations

- 1 block = 1 MB max
- 1 block ~ 2000 txns
- 1 block ~ 10 min
- So, 3-4 txns / sec




- Log grows linearly, joining requires full dload and verification
- Visa peak load comparison
  - Typically 2,000 txns / sec
  - Peak load in 2013: 47,000 txns / sec

## **Summary**

- Coins xfer/split between "addresses" (PK) in txns
- Blockchain: Global ordered, append-only log of txns
  - Reached through decentralized consensus
    - Each epoch, "random" node selected to batch transactions into block and append block to log
  - Nodes incentivized to perform work and act correctly
    - When "solve" block, get block rewards + txn fees
    - Reward: 12.5 BTC @ ~8100 USD/BTC (11-22-17) = \$101250 / 10 min
    - Only "keep" reward if block persists on main chain

## Bitcoin & blockchain intrinsically linked



## Rich ecosystem: Mining pools

health of mining ecosystem

- Mining == gambling:
  - Electricity costs \$, huge payout, low probability of winning
- Development of mining pools to amortize risk
  - Pool computational resources, participants "paid" to mine e.g., rewards "split" as a fraction of work, etc
  - Verification? Demonstrate "easier" proofs of work to admins
  - Prevent theft? Block header (coinbase txn) given by pool

## More than just currency...

#### BLOCKTECH in FINANCIAL SERVICES VIRTUALscape













---- Hard Wallets ----

Ledger Wallet

Microtransactions

**c**ase

keep





fidor citibank moni

#### MIDDLEWARE & SERVICES



digix

thingchain

skuchain





**DX**Markets

NOBLE MARKETS









PROVENANCE

















# More in CS 394 (Spring '18) ...

# Sunday topic: