Blockchain Systems

CS 240: Computing Systems and Concurrency
Lecture 21

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Credits: Michael Freedman and Kyle Jamieson developed much of the original material.

Bitcoin: 10,000 foot view

- New bitcoins are "created" every ~10 min, owned by "miner" (more on this later)
- Thereafter, just keep record of transfers
  - e.g., Alice pays Bob 1 BTC
- Basic protocol:
  - Alice signs transaction: txn = $\text{Sign}_{\text{Alice}}(\text{BTC}, \text{PK}_{\text{Bob}})$
  - Alice shows transaction to others…

Problem: Equivocation!

Can Alice "pay" both Bob and Charlie with same bitcoin ?

(Known as "double spending")

How traditional e-cash handled problem



- When Alice pays Bob with a coin, Bob validates that coin hasn't been spent with trusted third party
- Introduced "blind signatures" and "zero-knowledge protocols" so bank can't link withdrawals and deposits

How traditional e-cash handled problem



- When Alice pays Bob with a coin, Bob validates that coin hasn't been spent with trusted third party

Bank maintains linearizable log of transactions

Problem: Equivocation!

Goal: No double-spending in decentralized environment

Approach: Make transaction log

1. public
2. append-only
3. strongly consistent

Bitcoin: 10,000 foot view

- Public
  - Transactions are signed: txn = $\text{Sign}_{\text{Alice}}$ (BTC, PK_{Bob})
  - All transactions are sent to all network participants

- No equivocation: Log append-only and consistent
  - All transactions part of a hash chain
  - Consensus on set/order of operations in hash chain

Cryptographic hash function

(and their use in blockchain)

Cryptography Hash Functions I

- Take message *m* of arbitrary length and produces fixed-size (short) number *H(m)*

- One-way function
  - Efficient: Easy to compute *H(m)*
  - **Hiding property:** Hard to find an *m*, given *H(m)*
    - Assumes “m” has sufficient entropy, not just {“heads”, “tails”}
  - **Random:** Often assumes for output to “look” random

Cryptography Hash Functions II

- Collisions exist: | possible inputs | >> | possible outputs |

  … but hard to find

- Collision resistance:
  - Strong resistance: Find any m != m' such that H(m) == H(m')
  - Weak resistance: Given m, find m' such that H(m) == H(m')
  - For 160-bit hash (SHA-1)
    - Finding any collision is birthday paradox: 2^{160/2} = 2^80
    - Finding specific collision requires 2^160

Hash Pointers



Hash chains



Creates a “tamper-evident” log of data

Hash chains



If data changes, all subsequent hash pointers change

Otherwise, found a hash collision!

Blockchain

Append-only hash chain

Blockchain: Append-only hash chain



- Hash chain creates “tamper-evident” log of txns
- Security based on collision-resistance of hash function
  – Given m and h = hash(m), difficult to find m’
    such that h = hash(m’) and m != m’

Blockchain: Append-only hash chain





Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

Satoshi Nakamoto
satoshin@gmx.com
www.bitcoin.org

Abstract. A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main

Problem remains: forking



Goal: Consensus

- Recall Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols to achieve consensus of replicated log
  - Requires: $n >= 3f + 1$ nodes, at most f faulty
- Problem
  - Communication complexity is n^2
  - Requires **view** of network participants

Consensus susceptible to Sybils

- All consensus protocols based on membership…
  - … assume independent failures …
  - … which implies strong notion of identity
- "Sybil attack" (P2P literature ~2002)
  - Idea: one entity can create many "identities" in system
  - Typical defense: 1 IP address = 1 identity
  - Problem: IP addresses aren't difficult / expensive to get, esp. in world of botnets & cloud services

Consensus based on "work"

- Rather than "count" IP addresses, bitcoin "counts" the amount of CPU time / electricity that is expended

> **"The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes."**
>
> **- Satoshi Nakamoto**

- Proof-of-work: Cryptographic "proof" that certain amount of CPU work was performed

Key idea: Chain length requires work



- Generating a new block requires "proof of work"
- "Correct" nodes accept longest chain
- Creating fork requires rate of malicious work >> rate of correct
  - So, the older the block, the "safer" it is from being deleted

Use hashing to determine work!

- Hash functions are one-way / collision resistant
  - Given *h*, hard to find *m* such that *h* = *hash(m)*

- But what about finding partial collision?
  - *m* whose hash has most significant bit = 0?
  - *m* whose hash has most significant bit = 00?
  - Assuming output is randomly distributed, complexity grows exponentially with # bits to match

Bitcoin proof of work

Find **nonce** such that

hash (**nonce** || prev_hash || block data) < target

i.e., hash has certain number of leading 0's

What about changes in total system hashing rate?

- Target is recalculated every 2 weeks
- Goal: One new block every 10 minutes

Historical hash rate trends of bitcoin



Currently (Nov '19): 45.9 Exahash/s

2×10^{18}

Tech: CPU → GPU → FPGA → ASICs

https://bitcoinwisdom.com/bitcoin/difficulty

Why consume all this energy?



- Creating a new block creates bitcoin!
  - Initially 50 BTC, decreases over time, currently 12.5
  - New bitcoin assigned to party named in new block
  - Called “mining” as you search for gold/coins

Incentivizing correct behavior?

- Race to find nonce and claim block reward, at which time race starts again for next block

  hash (**nonce** || prev_hash || block data)

  – As solution has prev_hash, corresponds to particular chain

- Correct behavior is to accept longest chain
  – "Length" determined by aggregate work, not # blocks
  – So miners incentivized only to work on longest chain, as otherwise solution not accepted
  – Remember blocks on other forks still "create" bitcoin, but only matters if chain in collective conscious (majority)

Form of randomized leader election

- Each time a nonce is found:
  - New leader elected for past epoch (~10 min)
  - Leader elected randomly, probability of selection proportional to leader's % of global hashing power
  - Leader decides which transactions comprise block

One block = many transactions



- Each miner picks a set of transactions for block
- Builds "block header": prevhash, version, timestamp, txns, …
- Until hash < target OR another node wins:
  - Pick nonce for header, compute hash = SHA256(SHA256(header))

Transactions are delayed



- At some time *T*, block header constructed
- Those transactions had been received *[T – 10 min, T]*
- Block will be generated at time T + 10 min (on average)
- So transactions are from 10 - 20 min before block creation
- Can be much longer if "backlog" of transactions are long

Commitments further delayed



- When do you trust a transaction?
  - After we know it is "stable" on the hash chain
  - Recall that the longer the chain, the hard to "revert"
- Common practice: transaction "committed" when 6 blocks deep
  - i.e., Takes another ~1 hour for txn to become committed

Transaction format: strawman

Create 12.5 coins, credit to Alice	
Transfer 3 coins from Alice to Bob	SIGNED(Alice)
Transfer 8 coins from Bob to Carol	SIGNED(Bob)
Transfer 1 coins from Carol to Alice	SIGNED(Carol)
Transfer 5 coins from Alice to David	SIGNED(Alice)

How do you determine if Alice has balance?

Scan backwards to time 0 !

Transaction format

Inputs: Ø *// Coinbase reward*
Outputs: 25.0→PK_Alice

Inputs: *H*(prevtxn, 0) *// 25 BTC from Alice*
Outputs: 25.0→PK_Bob
SIGNED(Alice)

change address

Inputs: *H* (prevtxn, 0) *// 25 BTC*
Outputs: 5.0→PK_Bob, 20.0 →PK_Alice2
SIGNED(Alice)

Inputs: *H* (prevtxn1, 1), *H*(prevtxn2, 0) // 10+5 BTC
Outputs: 14.9→PK_Bob
SIGNED(Alice)

- Transaction typically has 1+ inputs, 1+ outputs
- Making change: 1st output payee, 2nd output self
- Output can appear in single later input (avoids scan back)

Transaction format

Inputs:	Ø	*// Coinbase reward*
Outputs:	25.0→PK_Alice	

Inputs:	*H*(prevtxn, 0)	*// 25 BTC from Alice*
Outputs:	25.0→PK_Bob	**SIGNED(Alice)**

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Inputs:	*H* (prevtxn1, 1), *H*(prevtxn2, 0)	// 10+5 BTC
Outputs:	14.9→PK_Bob	**SIGNED(Alice)**

- Unspent portion of inputs is "transaction fee" to miner
- In fact, "outputs" are stack-based scripts
- 1 Block = 1MB max

Storage / verification efficiency



- Merkle tree
  - Binary tree of hashes
  - Root hash “binds” leaves given collision resistance
- Using a root hash
  - Block header now constant size for hashing
  - Can prune tree to reduce storage needs over time

Storage / verification efficiency



- Merkle tree
  - Binary tree of hashes
  - Root hash “binds” leaves given collision resistance
- Using a root hash
  - Block header now constant size for hashing
  - Can prune tree to reduce storage needs over time
    - Can prune when all txn outputs are spent
    - Currently: 190GB

Not panacea of scale as some claim

- Scaling limitations
  - 1 block = 1 MB max
  - 1 block ~ 2000 txns
  - 1 block ~ 10 min
  - So, 3-4 txns / sec
  - Log grows linearly, joining requires full dload and verification



- Visa peak load comparison
  - Typically 2,000 txns / sec
  - Peak load in 2013: 47,000 txns / sec

Summary

- Coins xfer/split between “addresses” (PK) in txns
- Blockchain: Global ordered, append-only log of txns
  - Reached through decentralized consensus
    - Each epoch, “random” node selected to batch transactions into block and append block to log
  - Nodes incentivized to perform work and act correctly
    - When “solve” block, get block rewards + txn fees
    - Reward: 12.5 BTC @ ~7,200 USD/BTC (11-27-19) = $90,000 / 10 min
    - Only “keep” reward if block persists on main chain

Bitcoin & blockchain intrinsically linked



What can a "51% attacker" do?

- Steal coins from existing address? ✗
- Suppress some transactions?
  - From the blockchain? ✓
  - From the P2P network? ✗
- Change the block reward? ✗
- Destroy confidence in Bitcoin? ✓

Rich ecosystem: Mining pools

health of mining ecosystem

- Mining == gambling:
  - Electricity costs $, huge payout, low probability of winning
- Development of mining pools to ***amortize risk***
  - Pool computational resources, participants “paid” to mine e.g., rewards “split” as a fraction of work, etc
  - Verification? Demonstrate “easier” proofs of work to admins
  - Prevent theft? Block header (coinbase txn) given by pool

Selfish Mine Strategy

Selfish Mining

<u>Goal</u>: Get more than fair share

<u>How</u>: Maintain secret blocks, publish judiciously



<u>Intuition</u>: Risk some work, others waste a lot

Selfish Mining

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

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

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

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

Intuition: Risk some work, others waste a lot

Analysis of Selfish-Mine Strategy

- $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ = mining power of selfish pool miners
- $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ = ratio of honest miners that mine on the selfish pool block



Fig. 2: Pool revenue using the Selfish-Mine strategy for ... prop- ag... in ... the hones... above a threshold, which depends on γ.

In the extreme, 1/3 of selfish miners get a revenue that is always better

Observation 1 *For a given* γ*, a pool of size* α *obtains a revenue larger than its relative size for* α *in the following range:*

$$\frac{1-\gamma}{3-2\gamma} < \alpha < \frac{1}{2} \ . \qquad (9)$$

More than just a currency…

WEB 2.0 → WEB 3.0 COMPARISON LANDSCAPE.

WELCOME INTERNET OF BLOCKCHAINS



Matteo Gianpietro Zago

Blockchain Use Cases: Comprehensive Analysis & Startups Involved